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WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS, LOOK TO THE COURTS: USING
HYBRID TRIBUNALS TO BUILD JUDICIAL CAPACITY
AND END ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION IN
POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES
REEANA KEENEN*
INTRODUCTION
A news report from April 2017 that compiled data from South
Sudan, Nigeria, Somalia, and Yemen stated that each country is either
experiencing famine or on the brink.1 These countries and their link to
famine is not coincidental: each country is either in the midst of current
armed conflict or trying to piece itself back together following an armed
conflict.2 For example, in South Sudan, violent clashes between South
Sudan’s army and a rebel militia resulted in the “razing and burning [of]
entire villages.”3
Famine and other environmental harms are common in pre- and
post-conflict countries, often worsened by the conflict itself.4 In many
cases, natural resources may even be the cause of the conflict, such as in
Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”).5 With the
advent of the Paris Climate Agreement, the international community has
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1 Max Bearak & Laris Karklis, Starving to Death: Wars in Four Countries Have Left 20
Million People on the Brink, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/graphics/world/2017-famines/?utm_term=.cdc47e56378c [https://perma.cc/75S9-YTBE].
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 See, e.g., Janet Nackoney et al., Impacts of civil conflict on primary forest habitation in
northern Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1990–2010, 170 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION
321, 321–22 (2014); Karmayne Thadani & Rohit Ayyagari, Law of Armed Conflict and
the Environment, 45 ENVTL. POL’Y & L. 286, 288 (2015); Thomas Homer-Dixon et al.,
Environmental Change and Violent Conflict, 268 SCI. AM. 38 (1993).
5 Paul Armstrong, How diamonds fuel Africa’s conflicts, CNN (May 16, 2012), https://www.
cnn.com/2012/04/26/world/africa/blood-diamonds/index.html [https://perma.cc/2TW9-WYWB].
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sought to decrease global environmental degradation.6 However, current
international environmental policy fails to account for the unique chal-
lenges post-conflict countries face in reducing their negative impacts on
the environment because these policies do not address armed conflict as
both an underlying cause of harm to the environment and a major imped-
iment to its protection.7
As awareness of increasing environmental degradation reaches the
mainstream, the international community has attempted to ameliorate the
effects of human activity on the environment.8 International approaches,
such as the Paris Climate Agreement and the Sustainable Development
Goals, have treated countries enveloped in conflict the same as stable,
secure nations, thus failing to recognize the role conflict plays in the de-
struction of natural resources.9
Using the DRC as a case study, this Note will argue that the in-
ternational community should increase judicial capacity to prosecute crimes
related to the armed conflict in the DRC as a means of reducing environ-
mental harm resulting from the conflict. Part I of this Note will explore
the connection between armed conflict and environmental degradation
globally and particularly in the DRC. Part II shows why current interna-
tional approaches to environmental protection in post-conflict countries
are inadequate. Part III argues that building judicial capacity to prose-
cute conflict-related crimes is the most effective means of preventing
environmental harms in post-conflict countries. Specifically, Part III ana-
lyzes the merits of different non-prosecutorial and prosecutorial approaches
to capacity building, and ultimately concludes that hybrid tribunals are
the best method to build judicial capacity. Finally, Part IV uses the DRC
as a case study of how a hybrid model could best be employed in post-
conflict countries to maximize tribunals’ capacity building effects.
I. ARMED CONFLICT AS BOTH A SOURCE OF HARM TO THE
ENVIRONMENT AND AN IMPEDIMENT TO ITS PROTECTION
Where there is armed conflict, research has shown that environ-
mental harm is an offshoot of the conflict and that the conflict itself was
6 NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE ISSUE BRIEF 2 (2015).
7 Thadani & Ayyagari, supra note 4, at 286.
8 NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, supra note 6.
9 NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, supra note 6; UN and Congo Government explore new climate
change projects, UNITED NATIONS (Sept. 1, 2017), http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelop
ment/blog/2017/09/un-and-congo-government-explore-new-climate-change-projects/
[https://perma.cc/C6FN-HK7W].
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often caused by disputes over natural resources.10 The UN Development
Programme identifies the environment as one of the first casualties of
armed conflict.11 Armed conflict and environmental degradation go hand-
in-hand, and the two are inextricably linked such that environmental
harms cannot be stopped unless and until the conflicts are addressed.12
The correlation is not merely theoretical or academic.
A. Real World Situations Clearly Demonstrate That Natural
Resources—Competition for Them and Destruction of
Them—Are Both Fuel for and the Natural Result of
Armed Conflicts
The connection between the environment, natural resources, and
armed conflict can be seen clearly in the following modern conflicts: Sierra
Leone, South Sudan, and Côte d’Ivoire. Sierra Leone’s civil war lasted from
1991 to 2002 and was characterized by brutal violence and displacement
of most of its population.13 Seeking recognition, economic independence,
and a seat in power, youth rebel forces staged a series of coups against
the government.14
At the heart of the struggle for power was the desire to control the
country’s vast mineral and diamond mines.15 Perpetuating the exploita-
tion of the DRC’s natural resources, warlords from Liberia and Guinea
sought control over Sierra Leone’s vast diamond and mineral resources,
often contributing to diamond smuggling across borders.16 It is clear that
although the mineral resources in Sierra Leone may not have been the
10 For a summary and analysis of leading research on the connection between environ-
mental harms and armed conflict, see Simon Dalby, Security and Ecology in the Age of
Globalization, 8 ECSP 95, 96–97 (2002).
11 U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, THE CONFLICT IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE AND ITS EFFECT ON
WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES: A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE GROUND (2011), http://www.undp
.org/content/dam/rba/docs/Issue%20Briefs/The%20Conflict%20in%20Cote%20d%27Ivoire
%20and%20its%20Effect%20on%20West%20African%20Countries%20a%20Perspective
%20from%20the%20Ground.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TAW-6NF6].
12 See generally Walter G. Sharp, The Effective Deterrence of Environmental Degradation
During Armed Conflict: A Case Analysis of the Persian Gulf War, 137 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1992)
(arguing that merely proscribing environmental degradation during armed conflict is an
insufficient deterrent and that enforcement mechanisms are required).
13 MARY KALDOR & JAMES VINCENT, U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, CASE STUDY SIERRA
LEONE: EVALUATION OF UNDP ASSISTANCE TO CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES 6 (2006).
14 Id. at 9–10.
15 Id. at 10.
16 Id.
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sole cause of its civil war, capturing these resources both for personal gain
and as a means to fund political and military campaigns served as a mo-
tivation for fighting.17 Thus, “all sides were dependent upon the spoils of
war to finance their activities.”18
Likewise, in South Sudan, tensions between it and Sudan were
exacerbated by disputes over the oil-rich Abyei region.19 Following South
Sudanese independence in 2011, fighting continued over the Abyei region,
despite peace talks and ceasefires.20 For example, in 2012, South Sudan
ceased oil production after it claimed that Sudan had stolen over $800
million of its oil.21 The fighting over oil-rich territories on the Sudan–South
Sudan border led to the displacement of nearly one million people, worsen-
ing famine crises in South Sudan.22
In Côte d’Ivoire, political turmoil leading to the Ivorian Civil War
destabilized its government and its economy.23 Actors in the conflict, in-
cluding security forces meant to ensure peace, actively engaged in the
exploitation of Côte d’Ivoire’s natural resources.24 Particularly, security
forces received kickbacks from the illicit exploitation of cocoa and dia-
monds.25 Furthermore, land conflicts between migrant and indigenous
populations led to discrete violent clashes.26 Côte d’Ivoire has tried to
repair environmental harms resulting from its civil war and other conflicts
within its borders by evicting cocoa farmers in protected national parks,
although these evictions presented their own human rights problems.27
Notably, the conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire also had economic and envi-
ronmental impacts on the entire West African region.28 The spread of the
Ivorian conflicts prompted large populations of refugees to flee to Guinea,
leading to the exploitation of natural resources in the Guinée Forestière.29
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 CNN Library, South Sudan Fast Facts, CNN (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2013
/07/10/world/africa/south-sudan-fast-facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/TAW7-RD4E].
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.; Bearak & Karklis, supra note 1.
23 Côte d’Ivoire: Events of 2016, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/world-report
/2017/country-chapters/cote-divoire [https://perma.cc/6VC7-RXNQ] (last visited Mar. 11,
2019).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 11.
29 Id.
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Much like the above conflicts in Sierra Leone, South Sudan, and
Côte d’Ivoire, the conflicts in the DRC have had significant environmen-
tal impacts, and natural resources have been a main source of the con-
flicts themselves.30
B. The DRC Exemplifies the Connection Between Armed Conflict
and the Destruction of Natural Resources
Disputes over natural resources in the DRC have fueled armed
conflicts in Eastern Congo in more ways than one.31
The conflict began in full force in 1994 when Hutu genocidaires
fled to Eastern Congo following the Rwandan Genocide of the Tutsis.32
Armed rebel groups and Congo military members have fought over so-
called “conflict mineral” resources that are abundant in the DRC to fund
their campaigns.33 To much criticism, international efforts have focused
on limiting supply chains originating from these conflict minerals.34 Critics
of this approach say it has done little to decrease conflict, increase stabil-
ity, or prevent the exploitation of these resources.35 In fact, it has exacer-
bated the problem by forcing miners out of work and toward rebel groups
looking for sources of income.36 As many as forty different armed forces
are still clashing in Eastern Congo.37 
In addition to illicit conflict mineral trading, long-standing disputes
remain over fertile farmlands in the East.38 Ongoing conflicts and deple-
tion of natural resources without any meaningful international attempt
to secure sustainable peace and security has left the DRC without critical
legal and judicial infrastructure necessary to rebuild.39 The international
30 UN HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, VIOLENCE LINKED TO NATURAL
RESOURCE EXPLOITATION, INFO NOTE 5 UN MAPPING REPORT.
31 Van Butsic et al., Conservation and conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo: The
impacts of warfare, mining, and protected areas of deforestation, 191 BIOLOGICAL CON-
SERVATION 266, 271 (2015); The Eastern Congo: A CFR InfoGuide Presentation, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org/interactives/eastern-congo#!/ [https://perma.cc
/9TPG-GE5Y] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
32 COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., supra note 31.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., supra note 31.
38 Id.
39 Strengthening the Rule of Law and Protection of Civilians in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING (Sept. 11, 2018), https://peacekeeping.un
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community should focus its efforts on restoring peace to the DRC through
criminal prosecutions in order to prevent further environmental harms
associated with the conflict.40 In conducting these prosecutions, the inter-
national community should aim to build judicial capacity, as institution-
building is a cornerstone of peacekeeping operations.41 However, current
international approaches ignore the capacity-building aspect that is crucial
to ending natural resource exploitation associated with armed conflict.42
C. Current International Approaches Fail to Build Judicial
Capacity to Prosecute Crimes Related to the Conflicts and so
Fail to Prevent Further Environmental Destruction Arising out
of Armed Conflict
The situation in the DRC is currently under investigation at the
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) at the request of the DRC,43 but the
exploitation of natural resources has not been a main focus.44 The ICC
has jurisdiction over war crimes including destruction of property, murder,
and pillage45—pillage being the crime most closely related to destruction
of natural resources as a part of the conflict.46 However, even with pillage
as one of the crimes under investigation, prosecutions at the ICC fail to
address the destruction of environmental adequately.
The situations in Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, and the
DRC exemplify the connection between armed conflict and environmental
.org/en/strengthening-rule-of-law-and-protection-of-civilians-democratic-republic-of-congo
[https://perma.cc/SUB6-BLXM].
40 Sharp, supra note 12, at 5.
41 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R, RULE-OF-LAW TOOLS FOR POST-CONFLICT
STATES: MAPPING THE JUSTICE SECTOR 1–2 (2006), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Pub
lications/RuleoflawMappingen.pdf [https://perma.cc/P89B-JUFF].
42 See infra Section III.A.
43 Democratic Republic of the Congo: Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc [https://perma.cc/VWA3-BS38] (last visited
Mar. 11, 2019).
44 Id. (focusing primarily on conscription of child soldiers, rape, and forced displacement).
Note, however, that the Court has declared an intention to focus on environmental harms
in cases going forward, but it remains to be seen whether this intention will become
practice. Richard J. Rogers, ICC will investigate environmental destruction as well as war
crimes, OPEN DEM. (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights /richard
-j-rogers/icc-will-investigate-environmental-destruction-as-well-as-war-crim [https://perma
.cc/8FKB-GRPK].
45 INT’L CRIM. CT., supra note 43.
46 Patrick J. Keenan, Conflict Minerals and the Law of Pillage, 14 CHI. J. OF INT’L L. 524,
527 (2014).
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destruction. Actors in these armed conflicts used and continue to use
natural resources to fuel their campaigns while simultaneously competing
with their opponents for control and access to these resources.47 While
the ICC is currently investigating the situation in the DRC, these investiga-
tions and prosecutions fail to redress environmental harms adequately,
much less as a priority.48 They also fail to build domestic judicial capacity
to prevent future environmental harms.49
II. CURRENT INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES FAIL TO ADDRESS
THE CONFLICT AS A CAUSAL FACTOR OF ENVIRONMENTAL HARM
Current international approaches generally seek to impose limita-
tions on a state’s carbon emissions.50 Similarly, treaties may also require
that the ratifying state also take steps to mitigate its damage to the
environment.51 International environmental law could advocate environ-
mental protection through treaties in two ways: (1) by providing an
enforcement mechanism for the laws at an international level52 or (2) by
requiring that states take steps to implement the provisions of the treaty
at the domestic level with laws that enact provisions of the treaty, as the
Paris Climate Agreement has done.53
47 See supra Section I.A.
48 INT’L CRIM. CT., supra note 43.
49 See infra Section III.A.
50 Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 13, 2015, in Rep. of the Conference of the Parties on the Twenty-First Session, U.N.
Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, annex (2016) [hereinafter Paris Climate Agreement]; H.
Carolyn Peach Brown, Implementing REDD+ in a Conflict-Affected Country: A Case
Study of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 4 ENVIRONMENTS 1, 2–3 (2017) (discussing the
obligations of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation on the
DRC and its difficulties in implementation).
51 Paris Climate Agreement, supra note 50, arts. 4, 6.
52 See, e.g., African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, CAB/LEG/67/3
rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58, http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ [https://perma.cc/NU6V
-USJL] (providing in Article 21 that people have the right to free disposal of wealth and
natural resources, in Article 24 that individuals have the right to a “general satisfactory
environment favourable to their development,” and in Part II of the treaty for
enforcement through state reporting to a commission). A subsequent protocol was later
adopted providing for a court to enforce the treaty provisions.
53 See generally Paris Climate Agreement, supra note 50 (providing that states take steps
toward reducing emissions, preserving natural resources, developing “ambitious” national
targets, and implementing mitigation strategies).
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While those two methods of protecting the environment theoreti-
cally could work for post-conflict countries such as the DRC, there is also
a hierarchy of needs that post-conflict countries must address before they
can implement international environmental law.54 As a country still largely
in the throes of violent conflict, the DRC’s first priority, its most basic need,
is for the conflict to end and peace to be restored.55
Unless, and until, a certain level of peace and stability are reached,
post-conflict countries cannot begin to implement or even consider in-
ternational environmental laws.56 This hierarchy of needs makes sense:
safety and security must come first, and then recovery from the conflict
follows naturally from human security. Consider the DRC as an illustra-
tion and case study of these concepts. The DRC, a post-conflict country
still grappling with restoring its legal capacity, has committed itself to
environmental protection measures that are overly burdensome for it to
implement effectively.57
The DRC signed on to the Paris Climate Agreement in April 2016,
ratified it in December 2017, and the treaty entered into force in the DRC
in January 2018.58 The DRC is working with the UN Development Pro-
gramme to create adaptation and mitigation projects to reduce its carbon
emissions with funding from the Green Climate Fund.59 However, these ef-
forts will take second priority as more pressing security and peacebuilding
needs continue to go unresolved.60
With a crumbling judicial system and a total lack of legal or gov-
ernmental infrastructure necessary to carry out international environmen-
tal treaty obligations,61 the DRC must first shift its focus to regaining
security and stability within the state. The DRC should focus on address-
ing armed conflict as a contributing factor to the exploitation of natural
54 Peter Yeung, Paris climate agreement has ‘failed’ poor countries, report says, THE INDE-
PENDENT (May 15, 2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/paris
-climate-agreement-report-oxfam-a7030446.html [https://perma.cc/GR3T-F7U8].
55 See, e.g., Peach Brown, supra note 50, at 2–3 (noting that civil conflict and lack of gover-
nance and rule of law in the DRC has prevented it from implementing Reducing Emissions
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation+ measures).
56 Id.
57 Peach Brown, supra note 50, at 2–3;UNITED NATIONS, supra note 9.
58 Paris Agreement—Status of Ratification, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unf
ccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php [https://perma.cc/5947-9X8F] (last visited
Mar. 11, 2019).
59 UNITED NATIONS, supra note 9.
60 Peach Brown, supra note 50, at 2–3, 8–9.
61 UN OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R, CLIMATE OF IMPUNITY IN THE DRC, INFO NOTE 7 UN
MAPPING REPORT [hereinafter INFO NOTE 7].
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resources and environmental harms. Specifically, the DRC, with the help
of the international community, should address armed conflict through
increasing its judicial capacity to prosecute crimes arising from the conflict.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD ADDRESS CONFLICT
AS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO ENVIRONMENTAL HARM BY
BUILDING JUDICIAL CAPACITY OF POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES TO
PROSECUTE CRIMES RELATED TO ARMED CONFLICT
The international community should build the DRC’s judicial
capacity to prosecute crimes related to armed conflict in order to prevent
the destruction and exploitation of natural resources. Armed groups con-
tinue to operate in the DRC with impunity.62 According to the Interna-
tional Center for Transitional Justice, the military and other armed groups,
working either in conjunction or in competition with one another, have
continued to exploit natural resources, though the majority of the conflict
has ceased.63 Furthermore, although the DRC has held free presidential
elections and adopted a new constitution, it continues to lack an efficient
and effective judiciary, which would allow it to implement sustainable
transitional justice measures.64 There are both non-prosecutorial and
prosecutorial methods of addressing impunity and restoring peace to the
DRC that could prevent further environmental destruction.
A. Non-prosecutorial Methods Include Truth Commissions and
Governance Restoration Operations
The DRC implemented a Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
but this effort failed to hold parties accountable in any meaningful way.65
As the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa noted in its assess-
ment of the DRC’s situation, the justice sector “plays the additional role
of guaranteeing peace and stability,” and if it is ineffective or weak, “it
can plunge a society into anarchy and social unrest.”66
62 COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., supra note 31.
63 The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), ICTJ, https://www.ictj.org/our-work/regions
-and-countries/democratic-republic-congo-drc [https://perma.cc/6ELU-TXDU] (last visited
Mar. 11, 2019).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Richard Lee, Justice sector is failing in Congo, OPEN SOCIETY INITIATIVE FOR SOUTHERN
AFRICA (Sept. 17, 2013), http://jss.osisa.org/law/drc/justice-sector-failing-congo.html [https//
perma.cc/B7M2-SRMQ] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
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This is especially true of the DRC where, although criminal pros-
ecutions in military courts have been carried out for some Congolese sol-
diers, government and military interference has prevented the judiciary
from carrying out criminal prosecutions for those most responsible for
crimes related to the conflict.67 Human Rights Watch attributes impunity
for these crimes as a major cause of the perpetuation of violence in the
DRC.68 Failure to prosecute these crimes has led to the creation of new
armed forces because members of these forces believe there will be no re-
percussions for their actions.69 Moreover, even where the DRC has prose-
cuted serious crimes related to the conflict, its judicial proceedings have
fallen well below international standards in terms of investigatory pro-
ficiency, protection of due process rights, fairness and impartiality, and
independence from government and military interference.70 As long as
armed groups continue to operate in the DRC with impunity, natural re-
sources will continue to be destroyed and exploited as the groups fight to
gain power and control.71 As Human Rights Watch stated in its report to
the United Nations regarding judicial accountability in the DRC, the inter-
national community has “an important responsibility to support . . . steps
to enhance the national judicial system’s capacity to tackle impunity.”72
There are multiple ways the international community can work
in conjunction with the DRC to address impunity and restore peace and
stability to the country. Each of these approaches has pros and cons in
terms of their effectiveness in building peace and preventing further harm
to the environment. For example, one way to restore peace and security
would be to allow truth commissions to investigate atrocities without
criminal prosecutions.73 Truth and reconciliation commissions, such as
the one created in post-conflict Sierra Leone, serve to hold transgressors
accountable by creating an accurate, impartial, and full account of the
67 Accountability for Atrocities Committed in the Democratic Republic of Congo, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/01/accountability-atrocities-commit
ted-democratic-republic-congo#_ftnref1 [https://perma.cc/4DTH-BEMD] (last visited
Mar. 11, 2019).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 ICTJ, supra note 63.
72 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 67.
73 UN DEP’T OF ECON. & SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND UN DEV. PROGRAMME, THE CHALLENGES OF
RESTORING GOVERNANCE IN CRISIS AND POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES 73–85 (2007), https://
publicadministration.un.org/publications/content/PDFs/E-Library%20Archives /2007%20
The%20Challenges%20of%20Restoring%20Governance%20in%20Crisis%20and %20Post
-Conflict%20Countries.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Z8G-VP38].
2019] WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS, LOOK TO THE COURTS 959
atrocities committed.74 These commissions are appealing options because
they promote healing and address the needs of the victims while also
naming the actors who are responsible for the victims’ suffering.75
However, the commissions cannot fully promote security and peace
because they, by nature, do not have the power to impose criminal sanc-
tions upon the responsible actors and they require a large amount of re-
sources that are often unavailable, as was the case in Sierra Leone when
a lack of adequate resources sharply diminished the functions of the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission.76 Eventually, the Sierra Leonean govern-
ment had to work with the United Nations to set up the Special Court for
Sierra Leone (“SCSL”), a hybrid tribunal meant to prosecute those most
responsible for the atrocities committed in Sierra Leone.77 The SCSL was
created at least partially in response to the blanket immunity granted by
the Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation Commission.78 Thus, even
though truth and reconciliation commissions can help a country heal, they
lack the teeth necessary to provide actual accountability for serious
human rights violations committed in the context of an armed conflict.
Another non-prosecutorial approach to capacity—and
peacebuilding—is to provide international support for governance resto-
ration.79 This approach would focus on filling in personnel gaps in the
government, training government officials on issues such as corruption and
human rights protection, and creating the necessary legal and physical
infrastructure to run an effective government.80 It may also include such
measures as constitution building or implementing peace agreements.81
Undoubtedly, governance capacity building is an important, and even cru-
cial, step in the peacebuilding process. However, these measures alone are
insufficient to promote long-term peace, stop human rights abuses, and
avoid further destruction of natural resources because they do not hold per-
petrators of armed conflict accountable and they do not address the specific
role of the justice sector in promoting peace and security through prose-
cutions.82 The DRC is a prime example of the shortcomings of governance
74 Id. at 80–81.
75 Id. at 80.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 80–81.
78 Id. at 81.
79 United Nations Development Programme, Capacity Development in Post-Conflict Coun-
tries 3 (Capacity is Development Global Event Working Paper (2010)).
80 UN DEP’T OF ECON. & SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND UN DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 73, at 82.
81 United Nations Development Programme, supra note 79, at 4.
82 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 67, at 2.
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capacity building alone. It further serves as an illustrative example of
why it is crucial for the international community to build judicial capac-
ity to prosecute crimes related to conflict in order to stop the destruction
of natural resources.
In the DRC, despite a new constitution and the implementation
of democratic elections, the government and military continue not only
to promote the exploitation of resources, but also to interfere with criminal
prosecutions against members of other armed groups that are responsible
for destroying natural resources and carrying out human rights abuses.83
Thus, non-prosecutorial methods alone cannot fully restore peace or build
judicial capacity to end armed conflicts.
B. Prosecutorial Methods Include International Prosecutions,
Domestic Prosecutions, and Hybridized Prosecutions
The three main types of prosecutorial approaches the DRC could
take, with support from the international community, to increase its judi-
cial capacity include: fully international prosecutions at the International
Criminal Court (“ICC”), fully domestic prosecutions within the DRC’s
existing judicial system, and hybrid tribunals conducted in the DRC.
1. Fully International Prosecutions
The ICC came into force in 2002 by way of the Rome Statute, and
it now has 123 signatories.84 The ICC is a permanent body that has comple-
mentary jurisdiction—making it a court of last resort—with domestic
courts to prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.85
There are currently eleven situations under investigation at the ICC, in-
cluding the DRC.86 The fact that the situation in the DRC is already under
investigation at the ICC is significant because the DRC itself referred the
83 Id.
84 How the Court Works, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-the-court-works
/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z2PE-SACX] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019); The States
Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states
%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx
[https://perma.cc/JH8N-FADE] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
85 Jovana Davidovic, The International Criminal Court & Africa, CRITIQUE (Sept. 13, 2016),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-the-court-works/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc
/Z2PE-SACX].
86 Situations, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/Main.aspx [https://perma.cc
/JH8N-FADE] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
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situation to the Court.87 However, the Congolese government’s apparent
buy-in to the ICC process has not led to a high rate of convictions or prose-
cutions: there have only been four prosecutions, two of which have led to
convictions in the cases of Thomas Lubanga and Germain Katanga.88
However, the ICC, as a permanent international judiciary, has sig-
nificant benefits that could help the DRC in the long run. Most notably,
the ICC brings “robust international law jurisprudence and [helps] end or
limit the impunity for the worst of crimes,” according to Professor Jovana
Davidovic in her analysis of the ICC for The Critique.89 The creation of
a body of international criminal law jurisprudence could build the judicial
capacity of the DRC indirectly by giving national courts a model for in-
vestigation and prosecution of complex crimes the national courts would
not ordinarily prosecute.90 ICC prosecutions also provide indirect benefits
for domestic judiciaries by promoting long-term peace and security.91
Because the ICC prosecutes only grave breaches of international humani-
tarian law, its cases are often, and especially in the case of the DRC,
focused on high-ranking officials, which provides visibility and serves as
a deterrent for future crimes.92
But the limitations of the ICC to directly build judicial capacity in
the DRC and promote long-term stability make it a less desirable option
than other prosecutorial methods might be.93 For example, although the
high-profile nature of the DRC cases under ICC investigation can bring
visibility and serve as a potential deterrent, the ICC will be severely ham-
pered in the number of prosecutions it can carry out, limiting the reach
of justice.94 Prosecutions of high-ranking officials at the ICC require the
prosecutor to invest a large amount of resources and energy into investi-
gating charged crimes because the stakes are higher and the Court—
though it may not like to admit it—has political concerns.95
87 Id.
88 Democratic Republic of Congo, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc [https://
perma.cc/5GWL-ECGG] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
89 Davidovic, supra note 85.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 See id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Davidovic, supra note 85. The ICC is a part of the UN controlled by the Security Council
and by extension, the Permanent 5 (China, France, the U.S., Russia, and the U.K.). Current
Members, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/con
tent/current-members [https://perma.cc/6FCM-EKKX] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
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The most glaring drawback of using the ICC to carry out prosecu-
tions for crimes in the DRC is that it has little to no direct effect on the
judicial capacity of Congolese judges, judicial staff, court clerks, defense
attorneys, or prosecutors.96 The ICC is composed of eighteen judges from
State Parties to the Rome Statute, but there is nothing to guarantee that
judges from the State Party under investigation will have a seat at the
ICC.97 The lack of participation by individuals from the DRC therefore
means that the Congolese judiciary is left to interpret and apply interna-
tional due process standards and international criminal law jurisprudence
in complex cases without any guidance or prior training.98 In post-conflict
countries, such as the DRC, where judicial capacity is already lacking
because of armed conflict, purely international prosecutions at the ICC
fail to curtail impunity for the vast majority of perpetrators responsible
for natural resource destruction and human rights abuses because they
fall outside the ICC’s limited reach.99
The Court’s limited reach also contributes to critics’ perception
that the Court lacks social legitimacy, which can in turn affect the validity
of the Court’s judgments within the DRC. Only prosecuting high-ranking
officials could make victims feel that they have not received adequate jus-
tice for the crimes committed against them.100 Although legitimacy may
be less of a concern in the DRC, which referred the situation to the ICC, a
lack of legitimacy could contribute to the perception of impunity respon-
sible for the perpetuation of violence in the DRC.101
Thus, prosecutions at the ICC do not ensure armed groups will
cease to destroy natural resources and commit other grave crimes, even
though such prosecutions sometimes promote long-term peace and stability.
Namely, ICC prosecutions fail to build domestic judicial capacity, and so
leave countries to walk the line between allowing impunity and holding
prosecutions that fail to meet acceptable standards.102 To address the
96 Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 303–04 (2003);
UN OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE OPTIONS, INFO NOTE 8 UN MAP-
PING REPORT [hereinafter INFO NOTE 8] (proposing that a hybrid model would be best to
address capacity problems in the DRC).
97 Structure of the ICC, ABA-ICC PROJECT, https://www.aba-icc.org/about-the-icc/struc
ture-of-the-icc/ [https://perma.cc/2XLE-CKJJ] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
98 Dickinson, supra note 96, at 304.
99 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 67.
100 Davidovic, supra note 85 (explaining the importance of social and political legitimacy
of the ICC).
101 Id.
102 INFO NOTE 7, supra note 61.
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shortcomings of purely international prosecutions in building the DRC’s
judicial capacity, the international community could alternatively focus
its efforts on helping the DRC carry out domestic prosecutions using the
existing Congolese legal system.
2. Fully Domestic Prosecutions
Fully domestic prosecutions of crimes related to armed conflict in
the DRC could enhance judicial capacity to prosecute such crimes in the
future and prevent future environmental harms related to conflict. Do-
mestic prosecutions allow for actors in the international community to
enter the country and provide crucial capacity training to members of the
judiciary, prosecutors, and public defenders.103 Such capacity would,
because it is implemented directly into the country by national actors,
foster predictability and stability in the judicial system,104 which is vital
to establishing the legitimacy of a country’s own judiciary to promote sus-
tainable peace.105 Significant barriers to implementation of these prose-
cutions exist: lack of physical infrastructure; lack of training; lack of
appropriate domestic laws to handle such serious crimes as genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity; and extensive time required to
adapt these capabilities.106
Elizabeth Ludwin King, Professor of Law at Wake Forest Univer-
sity, advocates for passive ICC participation in fostering domestic judicial
capacity to overcome the obstacles in national prosecutions of international
crimes.107 She suggests the ICC should only intervene and take jurisdic-
tion, if, after two years and submitting a legal development plan to the
ICC, the country fails to build up its own judicial capacity sufficiently.108
This passive approach, she argues, would ensure that domestic judicia-
ries take ownership of the capacity building and peacebuilding processes.109
She argues this would avoid the issue of impunity.110 Additionally, she
notes that, although the two-year waiting period would initially delay pros-
ecutions, it would be more beneficial in the long run because domestic
103 Elizabeth B. Ludwin King, Big Fish, Small Ponds: International Crimes in National
Courts, 90 INDIANA L.J. 829, 837 (2015).
104 Id.
105 Dickinson, supra note 96, at 304
106 Ludwin King, supra note 103, at 837–39.
107 Id. at 843–46.
108 Id. at 846.
109 Id. 
110 Id.
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justice is generally thought to proceed faster than international law.111
While it may be true that domestic justice can be carried out more rapidly
than the ever-cautious ICC prosecutions,112 this does not mean wholly
domestic prosecutions are an ideal substitute for international prosecutions
or some combination thereof, such as hybrid tribunals.113 The two-year
waiting period, however, would ideally give the country a chance to build
the necessary legal infrastructure, implement the necessary domestic laws,
and undergo crucial judicial training to adjudicate international crimes
at the national level.114 If the goal is to engender sustainable peace (and
this is an important goal), in order to prevent future conflict and destruc-
tion of natural resources, then it is only logical that the country should
have time to prepare in order to get the prosecutions “right” the first
time.115 It makes little sense to rush a country into prosecuting before it
is ready because any resulting prosecutions would likely fail to adequately
bring justice or prevent future conflicts.116
Thus, while domestic prosecutions have an enormous potential to
build national judicial capacity to prosecute international crimes related
to armed conflict, King’s approach is wholly dependent on the ability of
the country to bring its legal infrastructure up to par on its own, bearing in
mind time, resource, and knowledge constraints.117 This is no easy task,
and seems to be more idealistic than pragmatic, as has been the case in
the DRC,118 which has carried out numerous military prosecutions119 and
a few dozen non-military domestic prosecutions120 for crimes related to
111 Id. at 847.
112 For example, Ludwin King notes that ICC prosecutions of Lubanga and Katanga took
several years and included additional years of pretrial detention for each before the cases
were concluded. Ludwin King, supra note 103, at 847.
113 Section IV.A, infra, discusses the value of hybrid tribunals in building domestic
judicial capacity, as compared to purely domestic or purely international prosecutions.
114 Ludwin King, supra note 103, at 846.
115 Id. at 837.
116 Sofia Candeias et al., The Accountability Landscape in Eastern DRC, ICTJ BRIEFING
(2015), https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Briefing-DRC-Prosecutions-2015_1
.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AC2-38RR]; Dunia P. Zongwe et al., UPDATE: The Legal System
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): Overview and Research, GLOBALEX, http://
www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Democratic_Republic_Congo1.html [https://perma.cc/MC8E
-TCJ2] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
117 Ludwin King, supra note 103, at 837.
118 Candeias et al., supra note 116.
119 Anneke Van Woudenberg, Dispatches: First Congolese General Convicted of Rape,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 10, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/10/dispatches
-first-congolese-general-convicted-rape [https://perma.cc/GQH2-WGQZ].
120 Ludwin King, supra note 103, at 846–47.
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the conflict. The formal domestic system, including military courts, have
initiated investigations and prosecutions against individuals for war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, but these cases have been
fraught with problems because the domestic system still lacks capacity
to handle these types of crimes.121
In the wake of the armed conflicts, the DRC’s judicial system suf-
fers from corruption and a severe lack of adequate resources.122 Although
legislators and international actors have drafted laws to incorporate the
Rome Statute into domestic law—even attempting to create a specialized
court system to handle the prosecution of international crimes—judges and
lawyers still lack sufficient understanding and experience with interna-
tional criminal law to carry out prosecutions effectively.123 Furthermore,
the DRC’s lack of resources continues to constrain its ability to investi-
gate crimes outside its physical reach and to implement the necessary
training and infrastructure to carry out subsequent prosecutions.124
Moreover, where the DRC has been able to investigate certain cases
and bring them to trial, the courts have conflated elements of interna-
tional crimes, creating an inconsistent and sometimes incoherent body
of jurisprudence on such crimes.125 The problem, therefore, with domestic
prosecutions of crimes arising out of conflict in the DRC is not a lack of
infrastructure-developing mechanisms (the DRC has implemented appro-
priate legislation and attempted to set up the necessary institutions to
adjudicate cases126), but rather a lack of expertise that requires not time,
but supervised experiential learning in the form of a hybrid tribunal.
IV. HYBRID TRIBUNALS PRESENT THE BEST SOLUTION TO PREVENTING
ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION FROM ARMED CONFLICTS BY
BUILDING DOMESTIC JUDICIAL CAPACITY TO PROSECUTE
CONFLICT-RELATED CRIMES
Hybrid tribunals are internationalized courts comprising domestic
and international substantive and procedural law, as well as national
and international actors in the tribunals themselves.127 They function as
121 Candeias et al., supra note 116.
122 Zongwe et al., supra note 116.
123 Candeias et al., supra note 116.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Hybrid Courts, PROJECT ON INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS, http://www.pict-pcti.org/courts/hy
brid.html [https://perma.cc/ZE7T-YD7D] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
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ad hoc institutions that are particular to a specific set of circumstances
within a country, and they are peculiar in their creation in that the country
involved has a say in the composition, laws, and jurisdiction of the tri-
bunal.128 Hybrid tribunals, though ad hoc in nature, should not be con-
fused with more traditional ad hoc tribunals, such as the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia or the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, which were still fully international institutions.129
Hybrid tribunals, because of their mixed nature, build domestic judicial
capacity to prosecute conflict-related crimes and promote sustainable
peace, both of which would prevent further environmental harms arising
out of armed conflict.130
A. Hybrid Tribunals Build Domestic Judicial Capacity to
Prosecute Crimes Related to Armed Conflict and Prevent
Further Destruction of Natural Resources
Hybrid tribunals are uniquely qualified to build judicial capacity
through prosecution of conflict-related crimes, diminishing the likelihood
of continued destruction of natural resources.131 While the Rome Statute
for the ICC includes, as a constituent act for a war crime, the destruction
of natural resources and pillage,132 fully international prosecutions cannot
adequately incorporate this jurisprudence into domestic law.133 Whereas
international prosecutions provide solid jurisprudence on crimes related
to conflict and destruction of natural resources, hybrid tribunals combine
this asset with domestic ownership over the justice process that fully
domestic prosecutions provide.134 Hybrid tribunals, therefore, act as the
necessary bridge between fully international and fully domestic prosecu-
tions to build domestic capacity in post-conflict countries.
At their inception, hybrid tribunals were hailed as the end-all be-all
of international criminal law’s future, but their popularity petered out
around 2007.135 In the past couple of years, however, hybrid tribunals have
experienced a resurgence of popularity in the international community.136
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 See Dickinson, supra note 96, at 306.
131 Id.
132 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.
133 Dickinson, supra note 96, at 306–08.
134 Id. at 307.
135 Harry Hobbs, Hybrid Tribunals and the Composition of the Court: In Search of Socio-
logical Legitimacy, 16 CHI. J. OF INT’L LAW 482, 488–89 (2016).
136 Id.
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This reflects a heightened sensitivity to the cultural values of post-conflict
countries and a recognition not only of their sovereignty, but also of their
capacity to be sovereign.137 Hybrid tribunals by their very nature respect
national sovereignty of post-conflict countries by requiring buy-in to the
creation of the tribunal and active involvement throughout the process.138
Hybrid courts also benefit domestic capacity building and promote
sustainable peace,139 which would allow post-conflict countries to prevent
future armed conflict, and therefore, future harm to the environment.140
Several advantages of hybridized prosecutions allow them to ensure sus-
tainable peace in ways that fully international or fully domestic prosecu-
tions cannot.141 First, and perhaps most importantly, involving local judges
and lawyers in the process serves the valuable purpose of respecting cul-
tural sensitivities and incorporating familiar domestic laws and proce-
dures.142 Local judges and lawyers contribute to the judicial process as
“translators” of local norms and customs to international judges, which
could increase the legitimacy of the tribunal to the local population, as well
as increase the efficiency and efficacy of the tribunal’s adjudicative pro-
cess.143 Indeed, where local judges have been incorporated into hybrid
tribunals but have not been given an adequate voice on those tribunals,
the failure of international personnel to understand the intricacies of
local cultural norms all but halted proceedings altogether.144 
The involvement of local judges and lawyers in the tribunal’s
proceedings is important to the success of the tribunal in achieving long-
term peace in another important way, as well. Hybrid tribunals provide an
avenue for local judges and lawyers to learn alongside well-practiced inter-
national judges and lawyers, building judicial capacity that lasts well
beyond the mandate of the hybrid tribunal.145 Because hybrid tribunals
137 Id. at 492–95.
138 See Lindsey Raub, Positioning Hybrid Tribunals in International Criminal Justice,
41 INT’L L. & POL’Y 1013, 1043–44 (2009).
139 Id. at 1043.
140 Sharp, supra note 12, at 12.
141 Raub, supra note 138, at 1042.
142 Id. at 1043.
143 Id. at 1042–44.
144 See generally Jessica Almqvist, The Impact of Cultural Diversity on International Crimi-
nal Proceedings, J. INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 1, 2, 15 (2005) (arguing that a lack sensitivity to
local culture of the affected country in international tribunals has diminished both the
efficacy and legitimacy of these tribunals). Note that although Almqvist argues for fully
domestic prosecutions as the solution to cultural sensitivity, hybrid tribunals equally
solve this problem, for the reasons stated in this Section.
145 Raub, supra note 138, at 1043.
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involve international actors who are accustomed to fair trial standards
and standards of judicial efficiency, their expertise adds to that of local
judges through a kind of cultural exchange of ideas.146 Local judges impart
knowledge of the local culture, domestic laws, and customs to international
actors, and the international actors share their years of legal practice
and familiarity with fair trial standards.147
As Lindsey Raub puts it in her article on hybrid tribunals, “such
a back-and-forth dialogue allows the national government to assert the
needs and wants of the victimized society, while allowing the interna-
tional community to ensure that international standards of justice are
met.”148 Whether a tribunal’s work has lasting effect on the country it
serves is directly tied to its institutional legitimacy within that country,
and that legitimacy comes from fair and effective trials.149 Through side-
by-side collaboration of local and international judges, hybrid tribunals
thus build judicial capacity to handle conflicts that involve the destruc-
tion of natural resources.150 Furthermore, hybrid tribunals also promote
sustainable peace in order to prevent future armed conflicts by conducting
proceedings in-country.151
B. Hybrid Tribunals Promote Sustainable Peace, Preventing
Further Destruction of Natural Resources During Armed
Conflict
Hybrid tribunals also have the advantage of being located within
the country that experienced the conflict.152 This means that victims of
atrocities can see up-close that the crimes committed against them are
given due weight, providing catharsis.153 Placement within the country
also serves a practical function: members of the tribunal have ready
access to evidence and witnesses, as well as access to the perpetrators.154
Location within the country, in combination with the involvement of local
actors and the familiarity with and sense of ownership over the tribunal
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 1044.
150 Dickinson, supra note 96, at 307.
151 Id. at 310.
152 Raub, supra note 138, at 1042.
153 Id.
154 Id.
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as a local institution, increases the tribunal’s power of enforcement.155
The tribunal’s ability to enforce its judgments and indictments through
communication and cooperation with local actors is one of the biggest
predictors of the success of a tribunal in affecting long-term change.156
Contrast this with fully international prosecutions and investigations at
the ICC: for example, the situation in Darfur was referred to the ICC by
the UN Security Council in 2004, and the ICC issued a still-outstanding
arrest warrant for Omar al-Bashir in 2009.157 Indeed, “[i]ssues of enforce-
ment have plagued the ICC since it first opened its doors,” and the ICC
still cannot ensure the necessary international and local cooperation to
arrest al-Bashir.158
The visibility of locally situated hybrid tribunals ensures the judi-
ciary is accountable to the public159—that it is not conducting sham trials
or failing to prosecute high-ranking political officials who hold great
power.160 While some would argue that this level of visibility within the
community creates a sense of “victor’s justice,” its effect on protecting the
independence of the judiciary outweighs this effect.161 Having a hybrid
tribunal located in-country also ensures the local community views the tri-
bunal as a local institution rather than an external body imposing unfa-
miliar standards, giving the tribunal legitimacy over purely international
155 Frank Dame, The Effect of International Criminal Tribunals on Local Judicial Culture:
The Superiority of the Hybrid Tribunal, 24 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 211, 272 (2015).
156 Id.
157 Maryam Jamshidi, The enforcement gap: How the International Criminal Court failed
in Darfur, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 25, 2013), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013
/03/201332562714599159.html [https://perma.cc/ZDU2-MEDC].
158 Id.
159 Raub, supra note 138, at 1042.
160 See, e.g., Heather Ryan, New Year, Same Problems at ECCC, INT’L JUSTICE MONITOR
(Jan. 9, 2015), https://www.ijmonitor.org/2015/01/new-year-same-problems-at-eccc/ [https://
perma.cc/5Q2L-JA4H] (where public distrust and a lack of accountability for both defense
counsel and the Cambodian government led to enforcement issues and a perception of
illegitimacy, hampering the tribunal’s efficacy).
161 Victor Peskin, Beyond Victor’s Justice? The Challenge of Prosecuting the Winners at the
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 4 J. OF HUM.
RIGHTS 213, 217 (2005) (explaining that victor’s justice is a problem facing international
prosecutions that stems from inadequate enforcement and a lack of accountability for
local government, which is often composed of the winning side after a conflict). However,
the problem of victor’s justice is less an issue in hybrid models because they solve the
issues of accountability and enforcement not only because domestic actors are on the
tribunal itself (acting as liaisons between the tribunal and the national government), but
also because the location in-country requires that the government be beholden to the
governed, who are likely more diverse the post-conflict government may be. See Dame,
supra note 155, at 272.
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models.162 The ultimate goal of the tribunal should be ensuring sustainable
peace—this is the only way to prevent further conflict and ancillary de-
struction of natural resources—and pursuing prosecutions of those the com-
munity deems most responsible is a crucial element of sustainable peace.163
Application of the hybrid tribunal model to the DRC shows why
hybrid tribunals are best equipped to build judicial capacity, not only in
the DRC specifically, but also in post-conflict countries generally, and
can help countries move toward preventing further destruction of natural
resources.164
V. APPLYING THE HYBRID TRIBUNAL MODEL TO THE DRC
The situation in the DRC lends itself particularly well to the hybrid
tribunal model because it is in a “sweet spot” of post-conflict reconstruc-
tion.165 The local judiciary, while not well-functioning,166 is functioning and
has even carried out prosecutions itself for conflict-related crimes, albeit
with some fair trial hiccups along the way.167 Likewise, the DRC has also
held democratic elections and filled in personnel gaps in government
positions, thereby restoring governance.168 By requesting the ICC initiate
investigations and prosecutions for its situation, the DRC has taken an
important step toward restoring peace and stability to the country.169
Together, these measures make the DRC a prime candidate for a
hybrid tribunal to pick up where the ICC has left off and begin prosecuting
those responsible for environmental crimes committed during the armed
conflict. The DRC has, in effect, brought its legal infrastructure to a suffi-
cient level to allow international actors to implement a hybrid tribunal
that will have a lasting positive effect on its domestic judicial capacity.170
To ensure the efficacy of the DRC’s hybrid tribunal, the international
162 Dame, supra note 155, at 276.
163 See Ludwin King, supra note 103, at 837.
164 INFO NOTE 8, supra note 96.
165 Ludwin King, supra note 103, at 846 (local judiciaries must have some time to rebuild
before they can begin prosecuting conflict-related crimes); UN DEP’T OF ECON. & SOCIAL
AFFAIRS AND UN DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 73, at 73.
166 INFO NOTE 7, supra note 61.
167 Id.; Lee, supra note 66.
168 TED DAGNE, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: BACKGROUND AND CURRENT DE-
VELOPMENTS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 6–7 (2009).
169 Situation in the DRC, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc [https://perma.cc/AU
5F-T4KH] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
170 Ludwin King, supra note 103, at 846.
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community should avoid pitfalls of past tribunals when crafting the tribu-
nal. The composition of the tribunal and the substantive and procedural
rules to be used are the two main issues the international community
should focus on when applying the hybrid tribunal model to the DRC.
A. Composition of the Tribunal
The composition of the court, comprising international and national
judges alike, fosters the capacity building prospect of the hybrid tribunal
model.171 Where the balance of the tribunal is off, serious concerns over
the legitimacy and efficacy of the court arise.172 Such was the case in the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”), where
domestic judges, appointed by and closely related to Cambodian govern-
ment officials, outweighed international judges at every level of the
courts.173 Despite a “super-majority” requirement in making decisions on
conviction or acquittal, the political influence of the Cambodian govern-
ment in appointing the majority of judges to the ECCC resulted in what
were largely perceived among the Cambodian people as “a slap in the
face.”174 Because the domestic judges outweighed their international
counterparts, and because Prime Minister Hun Sen exerted a great deal
of control over those judges, the tribunal doled out harsh punishments
predominately for the Prime Minister’s political opponents.175
To avoid these problems, the hybrid tribunal in the DRC should
thoroughly vet domestic judicial candidates, and these candidates should
be subject to a veto option by the UN Secretary General.176 Further, the
international community should consider creating an even-numbered
panel of judges for each court within the DRC’s tribunal, requiring a
majority of judges to make important decisions.177 Unlike the ECCC, this
would ensure cooperation and avoid politicization.178 This composition
would give the court more legitimacy in the eyes of Congolese citizens, and
171 Dickinson, supra note 96, at 306; Susannah Linton, Cambodia, East Timor & Sierra
Leone: Experiments in International Justice, 12 CRIM. L. FORUM 185, 186 (2001).
172 Dickinson, supra note 96, at 301–02.
173 Linton, supra note 171, at 191.
174 Peter Maguire, Cambodia’s Troubled Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2010), https://www
.nytimes.com/2010/07/29/opinion/29iht-edmaguire.html [https://perma.cc/6F3L-EX88].
175 See id.
176 See Linton, supra note 171, at 244–45 (suggesting that the international community
should retain some control over these processes).
177 See id. at 242–43.
178 See id. at 199.
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therefore allow the tribunal to build domestic capacity to prosecute conflict-
related crimes more effectively, thereby decreasing the likelihood that
natural resource destruction related to the conflict would continue.179 How-
ever, the composition of the court is not the only issue the international
community should consider when crafting a hybrid court in the DRC to
end environmental destruction through judicial capacity building.
B. Substantive and Procedural Law
The second component of a DRC hybrid tribunal is the mixture of
substantive and procedural law.180 The tribunal should focus heavily on
domestic substantive law to allow domestic judges to have a chance to
build a body of jurisprudence and gain experience adjudicating crimes
under their own law;181 this would ensure that domestic judges benefit
from the experience of international judges and create capacity to handle
these crimes after the tribunal ends.182 However, the tribunal should also
include provisions for violations of international humanitarian law and
international criminal law that specifically deal with destruction of natural
resources.183 As a necessary component of preventing future environmen-
tal harms arising out of armed conflict, domestic judges will have to build
their capacity to adjudicate such claims, and international law provides
a body of jurisprudence to use as an example. The procedural law should
be primarily that of international criminal law in order to ensure fair
trial standards are upheld and to teach domestic judges how to uphold
them going forward.184
Together, a balanced mix of international and domestic law, as
well as a balance of judges on the tribunals, will ensure a hybrid tribunal
in the DRC will be successful, providing a model to be used for future
tribunals in other post-conflict countries.
CONCLUSION
The most effective way to prevent future destruction of natural
resources in post-conflict countries is to build domestic judicial capacity
179 See Sharp, supra note 12, at 5.
180 Linton, supra note 171, at 243–44.
181 Raub, supra note 138, at 1048.
182 Id. at 1043.
183 See Sharp, supra note 12, at 5.
184 Linton, supra note 171, at 243–44; Raub, supra note 138, at 1043.
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to prosecute crimes related to the armed conflict. This approach recog-
nizes that clashes over natural resources are deeply connected to armed
conflict: armed conflict causes the destruction of natural resources and
serves as an impediment to their protection.185 Countries emerging from
conflict lack basic legal infrastructure to put an end to the conflict,186 which
would thereby put an end to the exploitation of natural resources. Those
countries cannot begin to implement other environmental protections.187
Building domestic judicial capacity to prosecute crimes related to
armed conflict, therefore, has both direct and indirect benefits on pre-
venting environmental degradation: It puts an end to the conflict itself,
alleviating the immediate harm. And it fosters sustainable peace by giving
domestic judges and lawyers the skills they need to prosecute future
conflict-related crimes,188 allowing the country to focus on non-peacekeeping
measures, such as implementing environmental protections under the
Paris Climate Agreement.
While there are three prosecutorial methods to address conflict-
related crimes in post-conflict countries (fully international prosecutions
at the ICC, fully domestic prosecutions, or hybrid tribunals),189 the model
the international community should focus on going forward is the hybrid
tribunal because of its unique ability to shape the judicial culture of the
affected country.190 Hybrid tribunals build domestic judicial capacity and
create sustainable long-term peace because they involve local judges and
are located in-country.191 This provides legitimacy, buy-in, and a “spill-
over” effect on local judicial culture.192
The DRC serves as a prime example of how a hybrid tribunal could
be implemented to achieve these goals to prevent future environmental
degradation. Actors in the Congolese armed conflict exploited the DRC’s
vast natural resources to gain power and to fuel their campaigns.193 Al-
though most of the conflict has ceased, the country still faces instability
in Eastern Congo, where much of its natural resources lie.194 The DRC
is ripe for international intervention in the form of a hybrid tribunal; it
185 See Dalby, supra note 10, at 96, 98; U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 11.
186 INFO NOTE 8, supra note 96.
187 See, e.g., Peach Brown, supra note 50, at 2–3.
188 See supra Section III.B.1.
189 See supra Section III.B.
190 Dickinson, supra note 96, at 306.
191 Raub, supra note 138, at 1042–43.
192 See supra Section III.B.1.
193 COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., supra note 31.
194 Id.
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has achieved a minimum level of governance reform, and it recognizes the
need for prosecutions to restore peace, illustrated by referring the situa-
tion to the ICC and instituting some domestic prosecutions of its own.195
The ideal hybrid tribunal to build domestic judicial capacity in the
DRC includes a balance of local and international judges, with safeguards
against politicization via checks by international judges.196 The DRC’s
hybrid tribunal should also include a heavy emphasis on domestic crimi-
nal law and should incorporate international law to address environmental
harms specifically.197 These measures target the pitfalls of other tribu-
nals, and maximize the likelihood that the DRC’s tribunal will be viewed
as a legitimate and effective judicial body within the DRC.198
This hybrid tribunal model can then be applied to other post-
conflict countries going forward. It is only after basic security needs have
been addressed through hybridized prosecutions for conflict-related
crimes that post-conflict countries can implement more long-term inter-
national environmental protections.199
195 Ludwin King, supra note 103, at 846 (stating that local judiciaries must have some
time to rebuild before they can begin prosecuting conflict-related crimes); UN DEP’T OF
ECON. & SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND UN DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 73.
196 See supra Part IV.
197 Id.
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199 Yeung, supra note 54.
